NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR-OBJECTION
TO A PARTICULAR WAR-United States v. Bowen, Cr. No. 42499
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 24, 1969).
Defendant, a draft eligible male, sought classification as a conscientious objector. A member of the Roman Catholic Church and an
advocate of its beliefs, he was raised as a Catholic and obtained most of
his education at Catholic schools. According to his understanding and
belief, Catholic doctrine' recognizes wars as being just or unjust. He
concluded that the present conflict in Vietnam was unjust and that it
would violate his religion and his conscience to participate in it.
In order to obtain classification as a conscientious objector, defendant complied 2 with all the requirements and regulations of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.8 When his application was denied
4
on the ground that he did not meet the requirements of Section 60)
of the Act, he made a personal appeal before his local board, which two
days later affirmed its prior denial of his application. Subsequently,
defendant appealed to the Michigan Appeal Board, which also decided
against him. He was then ordered by his local draft board to report
1 United States v. Bowen, Cr. No. 42499 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 24, 1969). In a footnote to
its opinion the court concluded,
from the ample testimonial and doctrinal evidence introduced at trial,, that at
least a substantial number of knowledgeable Catholic leaders count the doctrine
of just wars as a basic element of church dogma, that Bowen reasonably believed
Catholic doctrine to require that he make his own determination as to whether
the war was or was not just and, that having decided that it was unjust, conscientiously believed his religious faith made it imperative that he refuse to serve.
[The court also noted that] [w]hile not of direct pertinence, it is to be noted
that amicus curiae briefs were brought to the court's attention which documented the view that communicants of other faiths-Protestant and Jewishhave ample doctrine in their religions to support similar religious conscientious
objection.
Id. at 2 n.l.
2 In Nov. of 1967 defendant filed Selective Service System No. 150-Special Form
for Conscientious Objectors. (It is a questionnaire type form on which the applicant
gives his reasons in support of his desire for the exemption.) In it he set out in detail
the reasons why his religious beliefs required that he not participate in the Vietnam
War.
8 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 100, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (Supp.
IV 1969).
4 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560). This section provides in part:
Nothing contained in this title .. . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.
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for induction at the Oakland Induction Center on June 23, 1968. He
reported as ordered but refused to submit to induction. Defendant was
indicted and brought to trial on the charge of refusal to submit to
induction. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of California granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal,
declaring Section 6(j) unconstitutional because it violates the first and
fifth amendments to the Federal Constitution. 5
The first amendment to the Constitution states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." In a recent
decision, 6 the Supreme Court interpreted this amendment to mean that
government must be neutral in matters of religious theory, and that the
amendment mandates governmental neutrality among religions, and
between religion and non-religion. This interpretation was applied by
the Bowen court to determine that there was a violation of the first
amendment. The Government argued, that because the statute makes
no mention of specific religious sects and because it inquires into the
subjective beliefs of the individual applicant rather than into the tenets
of one's religion, there is no discrimination among religions. The court
refused to accept this argument and stated that its inquiry must go beyond the statute's words to its practical effects. On the authority of
Terry v. A dams,7 the court concluded that the statute, although not
overtly stating discrimination against any particular religious sect, had
in effect resulted in discrimination against those that did not preach
total pacifism, 8 and therefore constituted a breach of the establishment
clause of the first amendment.
Prior to this case, most of the controversy concerning the first
amendment in relation to conscientious objector status centered on the
question of whether or not the opposition to participation in war
actually had to be by reason of religious training and belief. Although
it was apparent that if religious belief was required, the statute would
discriminate against those who may have been sincere but did not base
their beliefs on religious grounds, the bulk of the courts, until recently,
found such belief to be necessary. 9 In United States v. Seeger,10 the
5 United States v. Bowen, Cr. No. 42499 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 24 1969).
8

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

7 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
8 Cr. No. 42499 at 6. The court noted that applicants, for conscientious

objector
status, of certain religions are generally exempted from military service while members
of other religions are not so exempted.
9 Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963) (did not clearly manifest a
belief in a Supreme Being to Whom he owed obedience); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d
13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956) (did not believe in a Supreme Being);
United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) (not founded on a belief in a Supreme
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Supreme Court ruled that the requirement that the objector's beliefs
had to be based on religion was unconstitutional. Seeger is in sharp contrast with the Court's previous ruling on this question in Sicurella v.
United States." In that case, the Court stated that "[t]he test is not
whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is opposed,
on religious grounds, to participationin war."' 12 To present, there have
been no cases decided since Seeger which require any kind of formal
religious beliefs in order to qualify for the exemption.
Since Seeger removed the necessity for a religious basis of opposition, the real substance of the holding of the instant case lies within
the realm of the fifth amendment. In its holding, the court stated that
"the first amendment specifically applies to religion whereas the equal
protection clause has a much broader sweep. ."...13
Although the equal
protection clause is embodied in the fourteenth amendment, and therefore applies only to the States, the Supreme Court has held that the due
process and equal protection clauses are not mutually exclusive and
that discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.1 4 Evidently, the Bowen court found this theory applicable. In
holding that Section 60) is violative of the equal protection clause, the
court disregarded the fact that Congress apparently intended to employ
a classification which would be reasonable in the light of the purpose of
the Act. The court justified this by reference to Shapiro v. Thompson 15
which held that "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right [any constitutional right], unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." This
court found that such classification did not promote any compelling
governmental interest.' 6
Being); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) (must be based on an
individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly
one).
10 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The court stated that
[t]he test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.
Id. at 176.
11 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
12 Id. at 390.
13 Cr. No. 42499 at 7.
14 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
16 Cr. No. 42499. The court statedapplying the Shapiro v. Thompson test, it is clear that there is no compelling
governmental interest for distinguishing the defendant, who is opposed to partic-

ipation in the Vietnam War on religious grounds, from others who are religiously
opposed to all wars.
Id. at 8.
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There have been many cases holding that one will not be exempt
where his objection is to a particular war. 17 However, there has been
one exception- United States v. Sisson.18 In this extraordinary case, the
court made its decision by balancing the defendant's objection to the
Vietnam conflict with the country's present need for his participation.
There is, however, a very important distinction between Sisson andBowen. Sisson did not hold that defendant could not be drafted, but
only that he could not be subjected to military orders that required
him to kill in the Vietnam conflict. The indication of Bowen is that
defendant could not be drafted while the United States is involved in
Vietnam. There is, however, no indication whether he could later be
drafted for combatant training and service in places other than Vietnam. 19 Also, Sisson, in accord with Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of
California,20 explicitly assumed, "that in time of declared war or in the
defense of the homeland against invasion, all persons may be conscripted
even for combat service."21 Because Bowen would grant to selective
objectors the same standing as absolute objectors, it can be assumed,
although not stated in the decision, that selective objectors like total
objectors can be conscripted in time of declared war or in defense of
the homeland.
Since the courts have long recognized that the statutory exemption
from military service offered to conscientious objectors pursuant to
Section 60) is a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional
right, 22 Bowen may not find universal approval. However, Bowen met
After noting that Section 6(j) may serve administrative efficiency by limiting the
class of persons eligible for conscientious objector status, the court stated "administrative
convenience is not a sufficiently compelling consideration to justify disregard of the
first and fifth amendments." Id. at 9 n.6.
17 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943) (must be a general scruple
against participation in war in any form and not merely an objection to participation
in a particular war); United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968) (exemption
does not extend to those who assert only selective scruples against a particular war);
United States v. Kurki, 255 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wisc. 1966) (court would not adopt a new
particular war test).
18 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
19 Quaere: Since prior to induction Bowen had no way of knowing if he would be
sent to Vietnam, did he have standing to raise this question at this time?
20 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
[T]he war powers . . . include . . . the power, in the last extremity, to compel
the armed service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or
his views in respect to the justice or morality of the particular war or of war in
general.
id. at 264.
21 297 F. Supp. at 908.
22 United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908
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this issue by citing Sherbert v. Verner,23 for the proposition that, "although Congress may take certain privileges or benefits away altogether,
it may not arbitrarily and unreasonably grant such privileges to some
and not to others." 24 It is apparent that this court felt it arbitrary to
consider the objections of total pacifists and not to consider those of
selective objectors.
It is much easier to comprehend Seeger abolishing the necessity of
religious belief as a violation of the first amendment, than it is to comprehend Bowen's finding that discrimination against selective objectors
is a violation of due process by lack of equal protection of the laws. It
is clear that Congress intended this privilege to be extended to a very
limited degree. 25 To some, this decision may be a progressive extension

of that privilege, but to many others it will be considered as another
exercise of judicial exegesis, creating legislation that the legislature
never intended.
Whether or not this decision is universally appreciated remains to
be seen; however, potential benefits and detriments are readily apparent.
Many draft eligible young men are sincerely opposed to fighting in
Vietnam. For them, this decision may have a far-reaching effect. It
offers the possibility of a reasonable alternative to being drafted, defecting, or going to jail. On the other hand, this case could encourage
many registrants to abuse the exemption. Complications may arise, such
as in the case of a registrant who sincerely believes that it is just to
kill the North Vietnamese regulars, but not the Viet Cong, or one who
believes it is unjust to kill civilians, and in light of recent developments, 26 believes that he might be subjected to such orders in Vietnam.
If Bowen is upheld, it will be interesting to see how the courts will
27
handle such situations.
(1969); Cannon v. United States, 181 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1950); Morbeto v. United States,
293 F. Supp. 313 (C.D. Cal., 1968).
23 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24 Cr. No. 42499 at 5. While Bowen indicated this to be the holding of Verner, it was,
in fact, only dictum. See 374 U.S. at 404.
25 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
26 United States Army 1st Lt. William Calley, Jr. is presently awaiting a court martial
for allegedly ordering men in his platoon to participate in alleged atrocities committed
on civilians at the village of My Lai in Vietnam.
27 See discussion of United States v. McFadden, 6 C.R.L. 1089 and 2405 (N.D. Cal.,
Feb. 20, 1970). This decision goes even further than Bowen in expanding conscientious
objector status.

